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Abstract
This paper carefully analyzes a passage of Ricardo’s Essay on Prof-
its ([1815] 1923), which suggests that he clearly understood the effects
of both interindustry as well as intraindustry trade. In the context of
the Essay model, Ricardo argues that free interindustry trade involv-
ing an exchange of manufactures for agricultural good (from England’s
point of view) raises the rate of profit through lowering the relative
price of the agricultural good. On the other hand, where trade in-
volves simply an exchange of manufactures for manufactures, these
being produced under conditions of economies of scale (“division of
labour in manufactures” (pg. 25 of Essay)), the rate of profit is unaf-
fected although that exchange of goods does raise welfare by augment-
ing the variety of commodities made available through intraindustry
trade. His Essay, therefore, is a precursor of the new trade theory.
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1. Introduction
The Ricardian trade model that is a staple of the pure theory of in-
ternational trade is based upon the England-Portugal, wine-cloth analysis
developed in Chapter 7 of Ricardo’s Principles ([1817] 1911). That model
explains only interindustry trade. The objective of this paper is to analyze
a passage of Ricardo’s Essay on Profits ([1815] 1923), which suggests that
he clearly understood the effects of both interindustry as well as intraindus-
try trade. Specifically, this paper argues that Ricardo had in mind, from
the point of view of England, two different welfare effects from international
trade: (i) Free trade increases the amount and variety of goods; and (ii) Free
trade raises the general rate of profit (and hence the rate of growth). In
Ricardo’s Essay model, there is a manufacturing sector alongside an agricul-
tural sector. In the latter, labor is applied to a fixed supply of land so that
diminishing returns to labor operate. In the context of this model, Ricardo
argues that free interindustry trade involving an exchange of manufactures
for agricultural good (from England’s point of view) raises the rate of profit
through lowering the relative price of the agricultural good. On the other
hand, where trade involves simply an exchange of manufactures for manufac-
tures, these being produced under conditions of economies of scale (“division
of labour in manufactures” (pg. 25 of Essay)), the rate of profit is unaffected
although that exchange of goods does raise welfare by augmenting the vari-
ety of commodities made available through intraindustry trade. The relevant
passage in the Essay is the following:
There are two ways in which a country may be benefited by
trade—one by the increase of the general rate of profits, which,
according to my opinion, can never take place but in consequence
of cheap food, which is beneficial only to those who derive a rev-
enue from the employment of their capital, either as farmers,
2
manufacturers, merchants, or capitalists, lending their money at
interest—the other by the abundance of commodities, and by
a fall in their exchangeable value, in which the whole commu-
nity participate. In the first case, the revenue of the country is
augmented—in the second the same revenue becomes efficient in
procuring a greater amount of the necessaries and luxuries of life.
It is in this latter mode only∗ that nations are benefited by the
extension of commerce, by the division of labour in manufactures
(emphasis mine), and by the discovery of machinery,—they all
augment the amount of commodities, and contribute very much
to the ease and happiness of mankind; but, they have no effect
on the rate of profits, because they do not augment the produce
compared with the cost of production on the land, and it is im-
possible that all other profits should rise whilst the profits on land
are either stationary, or retrograde.
∗Excepting when the extension of commerce enables us to obtain
food at really cheaper prices. (See pp. 25-6 of Essay.)
The fact that trade involving an exchange of manufactures for manu-
factures has no effect on the rate of profit except for a caveat on wages is
repeated in the Principles:
Foreign trade, then, though highly beneficial to a country, as it
increases the amount and variety (emphasis mine) of the objects
on which revenue may be expended, and affords, by the abun-
dance and cheapness of commodities, incentives to saving, and to
the accumulation of capital, has no tendency to raise the profits
of stock unless the commodities imported be of that description
on which the wages of labour are expended. (See pg. 80, Chapter
7 of Principles.)
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Notice that in speaking about trade in manufactures, Ricardo, writing
after Adam Smith, had in mind the “division of labour in manufactures.”
“(Nations) are benefited by the extension of commerce, by the division of
labour in manufactures. . .—they all augment the amount of commodities,
and contribute very much to the ease and happiness of mankind. . . ” With
scale economies in manufacturing, foreign trade “increases the amount and
variety of the objects on which revenue may be expended.” This form of trade
leads to welfare gains in the form of a wider variety of manufactures but has
no effect on the general rate of profit. On the other hand, interindustry
trade which involves an exchange of manufactures for food—“. . . where the
extension of commerce enables us to obtain food at really cheaper prices”—
increases the profit rate and hence the economy growth rate.
In this paper, I am not simply arguing that Ricardo was aware that
economies of scale could be a cause of trade. As Krugman ([1987] 1990,
pg. 63) puts it: “As Ricardo doubtless knew, and as modern theorists from
Ohlin on have reemphasized, countries may also trade because there are in-
herent advantages in specialization, arising from the existence of economies
of scale.” What seems clear from a careful reading of Essay is that Ricardo
actually had in mind a model, if not mathematically written out, neverthe-
less one that made logical predictions about the effects of two types of trade
flows—interindustry and intraindustry trade. As Maclachlan (1999, pg. 563)
notes in a fascinating contrast between the writing styles of Malthus and Ri-
cardo, “Ricardo is a model builder: beginning with just a few simple axioms,
he develops an ingenious system through which definite conclusions can be
deduced logically.” He continues, “Although Ricardo does not use mathemat-
ics in the expression of his theory, he presents a model that is susceptible to
mathematical treatment, as later authors have demonstrated (e.g., Pasinetti
1959).”
More to the point of this paper, authors such as Findlay (1974), Burgstaller
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(1986) and Maneschi (1983) have been inspired to write out formal mathe-
matical models describing Ricardo’s analytical structure as laid out in Essay.
They all fail, however, to incorporate the “division of labour in manufactures”
noted in the passage in Essay in their formalizations and so, with only in-
terindustry trade taking place, are not able to generate foreign trade within
their models that leaves the rate of profit unchanged. Apart from Ricardo’s
reference in the text to the division of labor in manufactures, further support
for making the assumption of increasing rather than constant returns in the
manufacturing sector in describing the Essaymodel comes from Stigler (1951,
pg. 185): “Ricardo, Senior, and J.S. Mill—and their less famous confreres—
announced the principle of increasing returns in manufacturing—for Senior
it was even an axiom. The exclusion of agriculture was based on the empiri-
cal judgement, not that further division of labor was impossible, but that it
was a weaker tendency than that of diminishing returns from more intensive
cultivation of a relatively fixed supply of land.”
If I am correct in suggesting that the manufacturing sector Ricardo had
in mind in Essay exhibits scale economies, one wants to know whether it is
possible to generate pure intraindustry trade which leaves the rate of profit
unchanged, and hence has no income distributional effects. As Stigler (1965,
pg. 448) has argued, “We increase our confidence in the interpretation of an
author by increasing the number of his main theoretical conclusion which we
can deduce from (our interpretation of) his analytical system.” He refers to
this rule of consistency with the main conclusions as the principle of scientific
exegesis. The aim of our paper is to show that Ricardo’s theoretical predic-
tion can, indeed, be established in a formal mathematical model. Hence, his
Essay model is a precursor of New Trade Theory.
The New Trade Theory refers to the body of work in pure trade that in-
corporates the role of scale economies and product varieties in formal general-
equilibrium settings. Some of the key papers include Krugman (1979), Dixit
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and Norman (1980), Lancaster (1980) and Helpman (1981).1 In Krugman’s
view (see Krugman [1987] 1990), the development of the new trade theory
can be traced back to the development of two approaches in the rigorous
treatment of the process of product development in the 1970s. The first ap-
proach is identified with the work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence
(1976), which imposed the assumption that each consumer has a taste for
many different varieties of a product. The second approach was developed
by Lancaster (1979), which posited a primary demand not for varieties per se
but for characteristics of different varieties and consumers differing in their
preferred mix of characteristics. These alternative modeling approaches to
specifying consumer preferences were put together with a production side
that exhibited internal economies of scale. Because new firms are able to
differentiate their products from existing firms, they retain some degree of
monopoly power. However, because of free entry and exit, economic profits
are driven to zero.
Two empirical facts of the postwar period seem to have helped in the
general acceptance of the new trade theory as essential to understanding de-
velopments in the real world. The first is the dominance of intraindustry
trade flows as opposed to interindustry trade flows that the application of
the industrial organization tools highlighted in the previous paragraph helped
to elucidate and provide a rigorous foundation for. The second is that the
dominance of intraindustry trade in intra-Europe trade flows seemed to ex-
plain the absence of income distribution problems resulting from economic
integration in the formation of the EEC.
It is remarkable that Ricardo, writing in the early 19th century, already
had an implicit analytical model which made clear predictions about income-
distributional effects depending on the nature of trade flows. In the next
1The new trade theory also includes work that introduced a strategic element in mod-
eling trade policy but that is not my focus here.
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section, we seek to lay out the mathematical formalization of Ricardo’s Essay
model which can explain the “two ways in which a country may be benefited
by trade.” This is followed by a discussion of the caveat on wages noted
earlier, namely, how intraindustry trade can affect the rate of profit if wages
fall as a result of trade.
2. Mathematical formulation of Ricardo’s argument
We introduce Ricardo’s “division of labour in manufacturing” by assuming
that scale economies are internal to firms. The market structure that emerges
is one of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. By introducing a monop-
olistically competitive manufacturing sector, we add a channel through which
trade raises the welfare of the consumers of manufacturing goods via a wider
variety of goods being made available to them for consumption even when
such trade leaves the profit rate invariant.
The manufacturing sector is able to produce any of a large number of
goods that enter symmetrically into the utility functions of the landlords,
who are assumed to be the sole demanders of the differentiated manufac-
turing good, which we will call the luxury good.2 The total number of
differentiated goods actually produced, n (which is to be determined en-
dogenously), is assumed to be a large number, although small relative to
the number of potential products. All goods are presumed to be produced
with the same production function, exhibiting rising average products, and
constant marginal products. With symmetry built into the problem, we are
assured that all manufacturing goods actually produced will be produced in
the same quantity, and sold at the same price.
There is a natural wage rate, w, fixed in terms of corn, the agricultural
2When we deal later with Ricardo’s caveat on wages, we show how intraindustry trade
can, indeed, affect the profit rate if workers also consume the differentiated manufacturing
good.
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good. The time elapsing between input of labor and the availability of final
output is fixed, and assumed equal in both the manufacturing and agricul-
tural sectors. In the production of corn, there are diminishing returns to
labor because of the fixed supply of land. The corn output is given by
Ct = F (T, Lc,t−1), (1)
where Ct = Lc,t−1f(T/Lc,t−1), f ′(·) > 0 and f ′′(·) < 0. Here T is the fixed
supply of land, while Lc,t−1 is the labor allocated to the agricultural sector.
Profit maximization requires that the wage rate be set equal to the present
discounted value of the marginal product of agricultural labor. Thus
w =
f(T/Lc,t−1)− (T/Lc,t−1)f ′(T/Lc,t−1)
1 + rt
, (2)
where rt is the rate of profit.
Let us next consider the profit-maximizing pricing behavior of the indi-
vidual manufacturing firm. By the symmetry imposed on the problem, we
can simplify our study of the behavior of the typical manufacturing firm.
Thus, the typical manufacturing firm solves the following problem:
Maximize
ptMt
1 + rt
− (l¯M + a−1M Mt)w
by choosingMt, the output of the differentiated good firm. For the individual
firm, the rate of profit is treated as a parameter; it is, however, determined
endogenously for the whole economy. Here, pt is the relative price of manu-
factures in terms of corn; and l¯M+a
−1
M Mt gives us the labor used in producing
each good at the beginning of the period, where l¯M is the fixed cost (in la-
bor units) while aM gives the constant marginal physical product of labor.
Solving the problem yields
w =
pt[1− (1/²)]aM
1 + rt
, (3)
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where ² > 1 is the elasticity of demand for the differentiated good. For
simplicity, we assume that the landlord consumes only the luxury good and
has a CES utility function of the form [
∫ n
0 c
α
i di]
1/α, where 0 < α < 1.3 In
that case, the elasticity of demand for the differentiated good, ², is given by
(1− α)−1, a constant. Equating (2) and (3), we have
w =
f(T/Lc,t−1)− (T/Lc,t−1)f ′(T/Lc,t−1)
1 + rt
=
ptαaM
1 + rt
. (4)
Rearranging (4), we obtain after simplifying, an expression for the rate of
profit:
rt =
ptαaM − w
w
=
f(T/Lc,t−1)− (T/Lc,t−1)f ′(T/Lc,t−1)− w
w
. (5)
We now work toward obtaining solutions forMt, pt and nt, the number of
differentiated product firms in the manufacturing sector. With the monopo-
listically competitive structure in the manufacturing sector, expected profits
will be driven down to zero by the free entry and exit of firms. This condition,
together with the first-order condition from solving the manufacturing firm’s
problem, will allow us to determine the output of the typical differentiated
product firm. With zero expected profits in equilibrium, we have
ptMt
1 + rt
= w(l¯M + a
−1
M Mt). (6)
Equations (3) and (6) together give us
Mt =
αaM l¯M
1− α . (7)
3It is straightforward to generalize by assuming that the landlord spends a fraction
of his income on the agricultural good by supposing that his utility function is given by
c1−θA [
∫ n
0
cαi di]
θ/α, 0 < θ < 1, where cA is consumption of the agricultural good. All wages
and profits are spent on corn. In the next section, we discuss what happens when workers
also spend a fraction of their income on manufactures.
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We see that each firm’s output is larger the higher is the elasticity of demand,
the higher is the marginal physical productivity of labor, and the larger is
the fixed cost (in labor units) that has to be incurred to set up the firm.
From the second equation in (4), we obtain an inverse relationship be-
tween the labor allocation to the agricultural sector, Lc,t−1, and the relative
price of the manufacturing good, pt. Substituting this relationship into (1)
gives us a negative relationship between the output of corn, Ct, and the
relative price of the manufacturing good, pt. Using the market-clearing con-
dition for the corn output in period t, we can determine the equilibrium
relative price of the manufacturing good. The desired wage fund for period
t is (1 + rt)Wt−1, where Wt−1 is the wage fund in period t− 1. Using (3), we
can write the desired wage fund in period t as
Wt = ptαaMLt−1, (8)
where Lt−1 is the total number of workers employed in period t − 1. We
require for market clearing that the desired wage fund (demand for corn) be
equal to the desired supply of corn in period t, that is,
ptαaMLt−1 = F (T, Lc,t−1), (9)
where we recall that Lc,t−1 is a negative function of pt. The equilibrium
relative price of the agricultural good, p−1t , is, therefore, determined and
we can easily check that it is higher the lower is the land-labor ratio, the
higher the elasticity of demand for the manufacturing good, and the more
productive labor is in the manufacturing sector. Thus, ceteris paribus, the
land-scarce country would, in autarky, have relatively more expensive corn.
With the equilibrium relative price, pet , determined, the optimal amount
of labor allocated to the corn sector, Lec,t−1, is also determined. The residual,
Lt−1−Lec,t−1, is employed in the manufacturing sector, giving us the optimal
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number of differentiated good firms,
nt =
Lt−1 − Lec,t−1
l¯M + a
−1
M Mt
, (10)
where Mt has already been determined in (7).
Now with a positive profit rate, the wage fund is augmented at the begin-
ning of each new period. This implies that the size of the employed workforce
rises over time with the corresponding implication that the desired wage fund
increases over time. Consequently, the relative price of corn, p−1t , increases
over time. From the relationship, rt = [ptαaM − w]/w, this implies that the
profit rate declines over time. Alternatively, we note that with the relative
price of corn rising over time, the labor allocated to the corn sector also in-
creases; with a fixed supply of land, the marginal productivity of labor falls,
giving rise to a declining rate of profit.
We now consider how intraindustry trade “increases the amount and va-
riety of the objects on which revenue may be expended” without affecting
the rate of profit before we turn to show how the extension of commerce that
“enables us to obtain food at really cheaper prices” will raise the profit rate.
Suppose that there are two economies that are completely identical, in-
cluding history as given by Lt−1. The relative price of corn, p−1t , would be
identical in both economies, and there would be no basis for interindustry
trade. There would, however, be intraindustry trade since landlords have
a love for variety built into their tastes. With intraindustry trade, both
countries continue to face identical relative good prices as would prevail in
autarky. This implies that intraindustry trade has no effect on the general
rate of profit. There is, however, still a welfare gain as foreign trade here
“increases the amount and variety of the objects on which revenue may be
expended.” More precisely, noting that the indirect utility function of the
landlord is given by n
(1−α)/α
t [T∂F (T, Lc,t−1)/∂T ]p
−1
t , international trade in-
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creases the range of varieties available to the landlords and raise their utility.4
It, however, has no effect on the rate of profit.
Turning to the possibility of interindustry trade, let us use an asterisk to
represent variables of the foreign country. Let us suppose that at the point
when both countries open up to trade, the foreign country is land-abundant
so that T ∗/L∗t−1 > T/Lt−1. It follows from the earlier discussion that p
∗
t > pt
just before both countries open up to trade, assuming identical production
technologies and natural wage rates in both countries.
When free trade is introduced, the foreign country is a net-exporter of the
agricultural good, giving a Heckscher-Ohlin basis for trade. However, there
is also intraindustry trade in manufactures with the home country being a
net-exporter of the manufacturing good. Under trade, therefore, the home
country is a net-importer of corn.
To obtain the world market-clearing relative price, we use the condition
that the world market for corn clears:
ptαaM(Lt−1 + L∗t−1) = F (T, Lc,t−1) + F (T
∗, L∗c,t−1). (11)
This equation can be rearranged to yield
ptαaM = (
Lt−1
Lt−1 + L∗t−1
)(
Lc,t−1
Lt−1
)f(T/Lc,t−1)+(
L∗t−1
Lt−1 + L∗t−1
)(
L∗c,t−1
L∗t−1
)f(T ∗/L∗c,t−1).
(12)
It can be readily checked that the world equilibrium relative price lies in
between the two countries’ autarkic relative prices.
Upon opening up to free trade, there is a shift of labor out of agriculture
into manufacturing in the home country as the price of corn falls. In the for-
eign country, on the other hand, there is a shift of labor into the agricultural
sector. Correspondingly, foreign trade raises the general rate of profit in the
4Since, given T , total rent, T∂F (T,Lc,t−1)/∂T , depends only on pt, and that is un-
changed, the benefit from trade comes entirely from an increase in variety, nt.
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home country, which is able to “obtain food at really cheaper prices,” that
being Ricardo’s main argument for why England should remove its impedi-
ments to the importation of corn even though the rate of profit declines in
the foreign agricultural good exporting country.
3. A caveat on trade and wages
Ricardo has argued that intraindustry trade—an exchange of manufactures
for manufactures—alone, if it does not affect the relative price of the agricul-
tural good, will have no effect on the general rate of profit. England will see
its profit rate increased if trade has an interindustry component, allowing it
to “obtain food at really cheaper prices.” This analysis is made under the
proviso that workers consume only corn and that the real wage is unaffected
by trade. That having been said, there is an interesting footnote appended
to the text which suggests one channel through which intraindustry trade
does affect the rate of profit. The relevant text is:
Profits then depend on the price, or rather on the value of food.
Every thing which gives facility to the production of food, how-
ever scarce, or however abundant commodities may become, will
raise the rate of profits, whilst on the contrary, every thing which
shall augment the cost of production without augmenting the
quantity of food,∗ will, under every circumstance, lower the gen-
eral rate of profits. The facility of obtaining food is beneficial in
two ways to the owners of capital, it at the same time raises prof-
its and increases the amount of consumable commodities. The
facility in obtaining all other things, only increases the amount
of commodities.
∗If by foreign commerce, or the discovery of machinery, the com-
modities consumed by the labourer should become much cheaper,
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wages would fall; and this, as we have before observed, would raise
the profits of the farmer, and therefore, all other profits. (See pg.
26 of Essay.)
If the worker does not consume only food, as assumed in the analysis
above, but also spends a fraction of his wage on manufactures, and his utility
function is given by c1−θA [nc
α
M ]
θ/α, where cA is consumption of the agricultural
good and cM is consumption of a typical differentiated good (symmetry being
assumed), his real wage can be written as [θθ(1− θ)1−θ]wp−θnθ(1−α)/α. Here,
as before, w denotes the wage in terms of the agricultural good and p is
the relative price of manufactures in terms of the agricultural good. For
given w and p, we see that the real purchasing power of the worker—the
wage in terms of the whole basket of goods consumed by the worker—is
increased. If we think of the worker’s subsistence wage as being given by
[θθ(1− θ)1−θ]wp−θnθ(1−α)/α, since he consumes both corn and manufactures,
and note that intraindustry trade leaves p unchanged but raises n, the value
of w required to achieve a given level of subsistence wage is now reduced
under pure intraindustry trade. Since the rate of profit is given by rt =
[ptαaM −w]/w, and now w falls with pt unchanged, we see straightforwardly
that intraindustry trade is capable of raising the profit rate through the wage
channel.5
5For analytical completeness, it should be pointed out that, in theory, there is another
mechanism through which pure intraindustry trade can affect the rate of profit other than
through the lowering of workers’ wages in terms of agriculture just studied in this section.
This mechanism works through the decreased markups of imperfectly competitive firms
under intraindustry trade. If increased foreign competition leads firms to reduce their
markups, labor would be drawn out of the agricultural sector to work in the manufactur-
ing sector at given p. This raises the profit rate. Fuleihan (1990) modeled a theory of
endogenous markups by drawing upon the variable elasticity of demand adopted by Krug-
man (1979) in the context of Ricardo’s Essay model to examine the growth and income
distributional effects of customs unions.
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